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APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND THE NEW
SUPREME COURT RULES
PERCY S. MORRIS of the Denvcr Bar and
Member of Rules Committee of Supreme Court

On November 12, 1952 the Colorado Supreme Court adopted
a number of amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure which
make radical changes in the rules relating to procedure in the
Supreme Court. They become effective February 12, 1953. These
amendments, together with other amendments adopted by the
Court during the preceding year, make the following principal
changes in procedure in the Supreme Court:
1. They reduce from twelve months to three months after the
entry of judgment the time within wfiich a writ of error may be
issued.
2. They eliminate specifications of points and provide that in
lieu thereof each party in his brief in his summary of the argument shall state clearly and briefly the grounds upon which he
relies.
3. They eliminate the separate and particular statement of
each point intended to be urged with appropriate references to
the specification of points. The summary of the argument will
perform its function.
4. They eliminate abstracts of record and provide that their
place is to be taken by a concise statement of the case in the brief
of plaintiff in error in an appendix thereto and, where required,
by a supplemental statement of the case in the brief of defendant
in error or in an appendix to it.
5. They require that, if previous extensions of time have been
granted, a motion for further extension shall contain a statement
setting forth all previous extensions and on whose application
tl~ey were granted and they require that ten copies of each motion or other paper that is not printed is to be filed.
6. They permit any brief of 35 pages or less, double-spaced,
including any appendix, whether filed separately or not, to be typewritten or mimeographed or reproduced in some other method
approved by the Clerk, instead of being printed.
7. They give similar permission for petitions for rehearing
to be typewritten or otherwise reproduced. But they further provide that petitions for rehearing shall not contain more than three
pages without consent of the Court.
In addition to these changes in the rules governing procedure
in the Supreme Court, the Court amended Rule 59 (b) so as to
change the time during which a motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence may be filed. Heretofore the
Rule provided that the motion on that ground might be filed before the expiration of the time for appeal or writ of error. The
amendment provides that it may be filed before tha expiration
of six months after the entry of the judgment.
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Idea for Amendment Originatedin the Court
The credit for the originating of these amendments belongs
to the Justices of our Supreme Court. On May 2, 1952, the Court,
without referring any of them to its Rules Committee, adopted
amendments which amended Rules 115 (a), 115 (b) and 115 (c)
so as to eliminate abstracts of record, specifications of points
and separate and particular statements of each point intended
to be urged. Thereafter the Court requested its Rules Committee
(consisting of Jean S. Breitenstein, Chairman, Joseph G. Hodges,
Thomas Keely and Percy S. Morris, all of Denver, and V. H. Johnson, of Cheyenne Wells) to draft and submit to the Court for its
consideration refining amendments to said Rules 115 (a), 115 (b)
and 115 (c), amendments to other rules to make their language
conform to the elimination of abstracts of record and specifications of points and amendments reducing the time for issuance
of writ of error, permitting short briefs to be typewritten, mimeographed or otherwise reproduced, fixing the number of copies of
each paper that is not printed that shall be filed and requiring
motions for extension of time to set forth all previous extensions.
The Rules Committee submitted to the Court on October 27, 1952
its report setting out the amendments which it had drafted to
effectuate the changes desired by the Justices. Less than three
weeks thereafter the Court adopted all of the amendments submitted by the Rules Committee with only four slight changes.
Benefits Hoped To Be Achieved
In deciding upon the changes in procedure in the Supreme
Court which are brought about by the amendments, the Justices
desired and hoped to effectuate the following:
1. Saving of the money of the litigants. This will be accomplished by the elimination of the abstract of record, which had
to be printed at very considerable expense; its place is to be taken
by the statement of the case, which necessarily will be much more
concise than the abstract of record and must contain only those
matters which are deemed by counsel to be material to the consideration of the case; Rule 115 (c) (3), as it existed since the
Rules were adopted in 1941, required that, in addition to the filing
of the abstract of record, there be set out in the brief of plaintiff
in error a "concise statement of the case containing all that is
material to the consideration of the questions presented with appropriate folio references"; now only the "concise statement of
the case * * * supported by specific references to folio numbers
of the record" is required. Further saving of money of the litigants will be accomplished by briefs which contain not more than
35 pages being permitted to be typewritten or mimeographed or
reproduced by some other method less expensive than printing.
2. Saving of the time of the attorneys. This will be accomplished by the elimination of the tedious and time-consuming task
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of summarizing large portions of the record on error in the preparation of the abstract of record which are not material to the
consideration of the case. Also, to a lesser degree, by eliminating
the necessity of preparing the specification of points and eliminating the necessity of including in the brief the "separate and
particular statement of each point intended to be urged with
appropriate references to the 'Specification of Points' " which, in
addition to the "concise summary of the argument," has heretofore been required by Rule 115 (c) (4) to be contained in the
brief. Under the provisions of the Rules before these amendments
were made, the same points intended to be argued were required
to be set out in three different places, to-wit: in the specification
of points; in the "separate and particular statement of each point
intended to be urged"; and in the "concise summary of the argument." Now the first two of these are eliminated, leaving only
the concise summary of the argument.
3. Saving of the time of the Justices, particularly of the Justices other than the one who prepares the opinion. When they
examine the opinion which has been prepared, they need not pore
through a lengthy abstract of record containing much that is actually irrelevant to the questions to be decided but need look only
at the much more concise statement of the case in the brief of
plaintiff in error and the supplemental statement of the case, if
any, in the brief of defendant in error in order to ascertain the
facts. Examination of the summary of the argument will in most
cases quickly show the questions of law involved.
4. Shortening the litigation. The outstanding factor accomplishing this is the reduction of nine months in the time within
which the writ of error must be issued. Also, the elimination of
the necessity of the attorney for plaintiff in error, after the record
on error has been prepared, spending a very considerable amount
of time in the preparation of the abstract of record and the elimination of the thirty days after the filing of the record on error
which heretofore have been allowed for the filing of the abstract
of record and the requiring the brief of plaintiff in error to be
filed within such thirty days will contribute to this result. Furthermore, the requirement that each motion for further extension of
time for filing brief must set forth all previous extensions and
state on whose application they were granted and the requiring
of ten copies of each such motion to be filed, so that each of the
Justices will have the history of the previous extensions before
him at the conference table and can keep a close check on the delays that have already occurred in reaching the point where the
case is submitted, will not only enable them to 'pass intelligently
upon repeated applications for extensions but also will cause counsel to hesitate before requesting unnecessary extensions of time.
Whether These Benefits Can Be Achieved
Will Depend Upon the Attorneys
The Court has, by these amendments, provided the means by
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which these economies in expense, in the time of counsel and in
the time of the Justices and the expediting of the termination of
the litigation may be achieved. Whether these benefits will be
realized depends entirely upon whether the attorneys, in the preparation of their briefs, will avail themselves of these amendments
to the Rules. For example, if counsel incorporates in an appendix
to his brief the same material that he would, under the former
practice, have included in an abstract of record, he will have
merely changed the name of his product from abstract of record
to appendix of his brief; in such case he will have imposed much
unnecessary expense upon his client, will have wasted much of
his time and labor and will have imposed upon the Justices much
unnecessary labor and required them to spend upon his case much
time that otherwise might have been spent in working on other
cases.
Don't Be Afraid to Limit Your Statement of the Case to
What You Believe To Be the Essential Facts
It was only natural that, when one prepared an abstract of
record under the previous practice, he felt obligated to at least
summarize practically everything in the record on error, regardless of its materiality to the questions to be determined by the
Supreme Court, lest he be open to the charge that he deliberately
omitted from the abstract portions of the record which he should
have included in it. However, under the new practice, he need
not be influenced by any such feeling, because he is required to
include in his statement of the case only those matters, both those
which are favorable to his client and those which are favorable
to his adversary, which he honestly deems to be material to the
questions to be determined on the writ of error and, furthermore,
he is expected, in the spirit in which the amendments were adopted,
to cooperate with the Supreme Court by omitting all matters
which are not material to the questions involved. If, in the exercise of his honest judgment, he should omit from his statement
of the case any matters which opposing counsel claim are essential
to the determination of the case, opposing counsel have the right
and opportunity to supply such omission in a supplemental statement of the case contained in their brief.
Again, some attorneys have been prone to include in their
abstracts of record and statements of the case much matter that
is immaterial to the determination of the questions of law in an
effort to gain for their clients the sympathies of the Court. This
is especially true in a case where, upon conflicting evidence, the
trial court or the jury has determined the facts adversely to his
client and the attorney, nevertheless, sets out those portions of
the evidence which support his client's version of those facts. Needless to say, such matters have no place in the statement of the case
under the new practice.
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On the other hand, counsel should be careful to include in
his statement of the case everything essential to the determination
of the case which he wishes brought to the attention, not only of
the Justice who will write the opinion, but also of all of the other
Justices. He must bear in mind that there is no abstract of record
and there is only one record on error and that all of the Justices
cannot be expected to read through such record on error and that
most of them must depend upon his statement of the case in his
brief for their knowledge of the facts.
It will be imperative that the statement of the case contain
references to the folio numbers of the record on error where the
various facts set out in the statement of the case appear. Heretofore such references to the folio numbers were contained in the
abstract of record but now, with the elimination of the abstract of
record, the only place where they can be shown is in the statement of the case.
Don't Argue in Your Statement of the Case
The amendment of Rule 115 (a) included in the Rule a direction that the statement of the case shall consist only of the essential facts and shall not contain any argument relative to the evidence or law. This direction must be kept constantly in the mind of
the attorney when he is preparing his statement of the case. The
Justices will examine his statement of the case to ascertain the
2ssential facts of the case; if his statement is a clear and concise
setting out of the facts, without any attempt to do any more than
state the facts, the attorney will be successful in what should be
his first task, namely acquainting the Justices with the facts relating to the questions of law to be decided. But, on the other hand,
if, through mistaken zeal, he mixes argument with facts in the
preparation of his statement of the case, he confuses the Court,
he buries the facts in a mass of argument, he makes it difficult
for the Justices to ascertain the facts to which the law is to be
applied and he does a great disservice to his client. After all, he
has ample opportunity to set out his arguments to his heart's
content in the proper place in that same brief (the portion designated in the Rule as "The Argument") and he must restrain his
desire to argue the case until he reaches that place in his brief.
Make Your Summary of the Argument Actually a Summary
With the specifications of points and the separate and particular statement of each point intended to be urged eliminated by
the amendment, the importance of the summary of the argument
has been greatly increased, because it has become the only means
by which are summarized the grounds relied upon for reversal,
modification or affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. In
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order that it may properly perform its function, such summary
of the argument must be, in fact, a summary, leaving to the later
portion of the brief the elaboration of the points relied upon. And
it is very important that the argument, which follows the summary, be subdivided, with appropriate subject-headings, in the
same order as the grounds are set out in the summary of the
argument, so that any Justice can refer to the portion of the
argument which relates to a point that he is particularly inter3sted in. And, if this is done, the "subject index of the entire
brief," when properly prepared, will be of great assistance.
The importance of a clear and concise summary of the argument can not be too strongly stressed. In commencing their study
of a brief of plaintiff in error many Justices examine first the
summary of the argument, even before they look at the statement
of the facts, and cases are often won or lost by the impression
made on the minds of the Justices by the summary of the argument. Counsel should strive to use clear, simple language in
stating their summary of the grounds on which they rely for
reversal or modification. They must have clearly in their own
minds, before they commence the preparation of their summary
of the argument, the grounds upon which they rely and they
must express them in as clear and concise a manner as is possible.
Legibility of Typewritten and Mimeographed Papers
Too much emphasis can not be placed upon the necessity of
typewritten briefs and other papers being clear, distinct and
easily read. This is particularly true as to carbon copies. It is
so easy to make the mistake of endeavoring to have too many
carbon copies made at one writing or not insisting that your secretary start with new sheets of carbon paper and renew them as
often as is necessary to secure good, clear-cut carbon copies. The
carbon copies which you give to opposing counsel and keep for
yourself should be the bottom ones, leaving the better ones for
filing with the Court. The Clerk is directed by the Rule to refuse
to accept for filing motions, petitions and briefs that are not
"plainly and distinctly legible." Furthermore, even if the Clerk
does permit to be filed carbon copies which are so indistinct and
unclear as to impose a strain upon the eyes of the Justices who
are to read them, the penalty may be that some of the Justices
simply will not read them. The Court has given permission for
the filing of typewritten briefs of 35 pages or less. The least that
we attorneys can do in return for this is to cooperate by seeing
that all carbon copies filed with the Court are clear and capable
of being read easily and without eye-strain.
If briefs, motions and other papers are reproduced by some
method other than typewriting or printing, care must be taken to
see that the method of reproduction is one that produces copies
that are clear-cut and distinct.
The text of the rules as they have been changed by the
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amendments adopted November 12, 1952, effective February 12,
1953, appears in the same issue of DICTA in which this article is
printed. However, such text does not on its face show what deletions from and additions to the previous language of the respective rules were made by such amendments. Therefore a summary
of the changes made in each rule by the amendments will be helpful.
Rule 59 (b)-Time for Motion for New Trial
Previously, this Rule provided that a motion for new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence might be made before
the expiration of the time for appeal or writ of error. But, with
the time for writ of error being cut down from one year to three
months, the time for writ of error is too short to be of much value
with respect to seeking new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence and so the amendment permits the motion on that
ground to be filed before the expiration of six months after the
entry of the judgment. Such period of six months is the same
period that is provided by Rule 60 (b) for filing a motion for
relief from a judgment on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect or of fraud, misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party.
Rule 111 (b)-Limitation on Time of Issuance of
Writ of Error
When, in 1940, the original Revision Committee submitted
the Rules to the Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption,
this Rule, as submitted and recommended by the Revision Committee, provided that no writ of error shall be issued after six
months from the entry of the judgment complained of. The Supreme
Court, as then constituted, saw fit, in adopting the Rules, to
change such period to twelve months, which was the time allowed
by the Code of Civil Procedure. The amendment adopted November 12, 1952 reduces to three months from the entry of the judgment complained of the time for the issuance of writ of error in
cases within paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of Rule
111.
A study of the time within which a review of a judgment
must be initiated by action taken in the appellate court in 39
states shows that, of such 39 states, only one, namely Colorado,
provides as long a period as 12 months and that only one other
state, namely, West Virginia, provides for a greater time than
6 months. Such study further shows that, of such 39 states, eight
provide a limit of 6 months, one provides 4 months and four provide 90 days or 3 months. In one state the time is discretionary
and in the remaining twenty-three states the time is less than 3
months or 90 days.
The amendment further provides that, as to judgments which
were entered before the effective date of the amendment and as
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to which the period for issuance of writ of error at the time they
were entered was twelve months, the writ of error may be issued
within twelve months after the entry of the judgment or within
three months from the effective date of the amendment, whichever
period expires first. Since the effective date of the amendment is
February 12, 1953, the effect of this proviso is that, as to a judgment in a case within paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of Rule
111 (a), the writ of error must be issued on or before May 12,
1953 if the judgment was entered on or after May 12, 1952 and
prior to February 12, 1953, and that it must be issued before the
expiration of twelve months after the entry of the judgment if
the judgment was entered before May 12, 1952.
The amendment makes no substantial change in the provisions of this Rule relating to the period for issuance of writ of
error to review judgments in special proceedings and therefore
the decision of our Supreme Court in Sitler v. Brians, handed
down October 6, 1952 and appearing in the Colorado Bar Association Advance Sheet for October 11, 1952 on pages 48 and 49, but
not yet otherwise reported, is as applicable to the Rule as amended
as it was to the Rule before it was amended. Therefore the Committee on Rules prepared a Committee Note to this amendment
which, with reference to special proceedings, refers to Rule 81 (a)
and to Sitler v. Brians.
If an attorney should be worried because the period of three
months for entry of the judgment, or a large part of, has elapsed
before a motion for new trial, seasonably filed, was denied, he
should read the opinion in Bankers Trust Company v. Hall, 116
Colo. 566, 571-572; 183 P. 986, 989, and relax. In that case the
Court, following previous decisions, held that until a motion for
new trial is determined a judgment is not final so far as the
prosecution of writ of error is concerned.
Rule 111 (c)-How Writ of Error Obtained
A change was made in the language of this Rule so as to require that the designation of parties be filed simultaneously with
whichever one is filed first of the record on error and the praecipe.
It was felt that, with the time for issuance of writ of error reduced to three months, there would be a greater use of the method
of having the writ of error issued by the filing of a praecipe and
that it is desirable to have certainty as to the alignment of the
parties from the time of the issuance of the writ of error.
The second change in this rule was the addition of provisions that, in the event that the party filing the praecipe does
not comply with the provisions of Rule 112 (which relate to the
preparation and certification of the record on error and the advancement of the cost of same), the Clerk of the trial court shall
certify that fact to the Supreme Court and shall give notice to
all parties to the case of such certification in accordance with
Rule 5 and that, upon receipt of such certification, the Supreme
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Court shall make whatever disposition of the writ of error or take
whatever other action it deems proper. The purpose of these provisions is to enable a defendant in error, who may wish to ask
for reversal or modification of portions of the judgment of the
trial court which are unfavorable to him, to ask the Supreme
Court to take such action as the Supreme Court may see fit to
preserve his rights to have reviewed such portions of the judgment
and to enable the Supreme Court to grant such relief as it may
see fit.
The Supreme Court adopted a Committee Note to the amendment of this Rule in which attention of the attorneys is called to
the fact that, once the praecipe for writ of error is filed within
the time allowed by Rule 111 (b), the period of sixty days allowed
for the filing of the record on error may be enlarged or extended
by the Supreme Court under the provisions of Rule 6 (b). Because
of this, if the attorney for the party seeking review of the judgment is unable to secure the record on error in time to file it with
the Clerk of the Supreme Court within the three months allowed
for issuance of the writ of error, he may, within such three months,
file the praecipe for writ of error without filing the record on
error and then, if he will be unable to file the record on error
within the sixty days allowed by this Rule for same, he may, with
or without notice, ask during such sixty days the Supreme Court
to extend the time for the filing of the record on error. The granting of such extension, however, will rest entirely within the discretion of the Court. See also Rule 115 (e).
Rule 111 (f)-Grounds for Reversal
This Rule was previously entitled "Specification of Points"
and it has been rewritten entirely because of the elimination of
the necessity of filing a Specification of Points and the use of
the Summary of the Argument in its place. It provides that no
assignments of error, assignments of cross error or formal joinder
in error, nor any specification of points or cross specification of
points shall be filed and that in lieu thereof each party in his brief;
in his summary of the argument required by Rule 115 (c) shall
state clearly and briefly the grounds upon which he relies in seeking a reversal or modification of the judgment or the correction
of adverse findings, orders or rulings of the trial court and that
he will be limited to the grounds so stated; although the Court
may, in its discretion, notice any error appearing of record.
The amendment of this Rule also adds provisions that, when
a writ of error has issued, it shall not be dismissed upon motion
of a plaintiff in error without notice to all interested parties whose
appearances have been -entered in the Supreme Court and order
of the Court permitting such dismissal and that, if dismissal is
objected to by any such interested party, he may, in the Court's
discretion, seek reversal, modification, or correction of the judgment. The purpose of these provisions is to enable a defendant
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in error, who may wish to ask for reversal or modification of
portions 6f the judgment which are unfavorable to him, to object
to the dismissal of the writ of error and, in case of such an objection by him, to enable the Supreme Court to permit him to seek
the reversal, modification or correction of the judgment. These
provisions seemed desirable because of the shortening of the time
within which writ of error may be issued. It is to be noted that
the amendment requires notice of the proposed dismissal to be
given to only those parties whose appearances had already been
entered in the Supreme Court. This is in line with the provision
already contained in Rule 111 (e) that, in default of a defendant
in error appearing in the Supreme Court and paying the required
docket fee, the plaintiff in error shall not be required to serve
him with any papers required by the Rules and that the Court
may proceed to a determination of the writ of error ex parte.
Therefore, if an attorney who represents a defendant in error
is desirous of asking the Supreme Court to reverse, modify or
correct portions of the judgment which are unfavorable to his
client, he should, as soon as possible after learning of the issuance of the writ of error, enter the appearance of his client in
the Supreme Court and pay his docket fee in that Court.
In amending this Rule, the Court omitted the following language which had previously appeared in it: "No writ of error
shall be dismissed and no specification of points shall be disregarded on account of any technical defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties." The omission of this sentence was
not recommended by the Rules Committee. It would seem that the
omission was due to a feeling on the part of the Justices that what
is a "technical defect not affecting the substantial rights of the
parties" is so indefinite and uncertain that the hands of the Court
should not be tied by such a provision.
Rule 112 (e)--Agreed Statement
The only change made by the amendment of this Rule was to
substitute the word "grounds" for "points," in view of the elimination of the Specification of Points.
Rule 113 (a)-Application for Supersedeas
This Rule has already permitted briefs on application for
supersedeas to be typewritten. The amendments made in it merely
permit them to be typewritten or mimeographed or otherwise reproducd or, at the election of the party filing same, to be printed,
all as provided by Rule 115 (h).
Rule 114 (b)-Costs in Proceeding by a Poor Person
The amendments made to this Rule consist only of changes
required by the elimination of specifications of points and abstracts
of record and the revision of Rule 115 (h) relating to the form
of briefs.
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Rule 114 (c)-Costs
This Rule was, by amendment adopted November 12, 1952,
changed in two respects: The first was to limit the requirement
for the payment, as part of the costs, of the expense incurred by
the successful party for printing the abstract of record to cases
where, at the time the printed abstract of record was filed, it was
required by the Rules to be filed. The second was to increase in such
cases the limitation upon the amount to be paid from $1.00 to $2.75
per page of the abstract of record and to increase the limitation
on the amount of costs to be paid to cover the expenses of the
successful party in procuring the record on writ of error from
twenty cents to thirty cents per folio; these increases were made
in order to furnish a payment of costs commensurate with the
expense actually paid, in view of the increase which occurred in
these items since the Rules were adopted.
Rule 115-Briefs, Motions and Withdrawal of Papers
The title of Rule 115 was changed to read as above, thereby
eliminating the word "Abstracts."
Rule 115 (a)-Statement of Case
The heading of this Rule originally read "Abstract of Record; Contents." On May 2, 1952 the Court adopted an amendment by which such title was changed to "Statement of Case"
and such amendment provided that no abstract of record is required and that the plaintiff in error shall set forth in his brief
a concise statement of the case containing all that is material to
the consideration of the questions presented with appropriate
folio references to the record and permitting such statement to
be set forth either in the brief or in an appendix thereto. The
text of this amendment, as well of as the amendments of Rules
115 (b) and 115 (c) which the Court made at the same time,
appeared on pages 215 and 216 of the June 1952 issue of Dicta.
Thereafter the Court requested its Rules Committee to prepare and submit.for the consideration of the Court further amendments of this Rule and of Rules 105 (b) and (c) which might
express in greater detail the purpose which the Court had in mind
in making the amendment of May 2, 1952. The amendment of
this Rule which was submitted by the Rules Committee was adopted
by the Court on November 12, 1952 with one slight change.
The principal provisions of such amendment have been summarized and commented upon in the earlier portion of this article
and for details of its provisions the reader is referred to its text
which is set out in full elsewhere in this issue of Dicta.
Rule 115 (b)-Briefs; When Filed
This Rule was amended by the Court on May 2, 1952 to fix
the time for the filing of the brief of plaintiff in error at thirty
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days after filing the record or, where application for supersedeas
is pending, within thirty days from the date of the determination
thereof, unless the Court makes final determination of the case
on such application for supersedeas. Theretofore that had been
the time for filing the abstract of record, and the time for filing
brief of plaintiff in error had been thirty days after the filing of
the abstract of record. This amendment was made necessary by
the elimination of the abstract of record.
On November 12, 1952 the Court adopted an amendment to
this Rule which had been drafted by the Committee which made
no further substantial change except to delete the provision that
fifteen copies of every brief shall be filed. This change was made
because the matter of the number of copies of briefs to be filed
was covered by an amendment of Rule 115 (i) which was submitted by the Committee and adopted by the Court.
Rule 115 (c)-Briefs; Contents
The amendment of this Rule which was adopted by the Court
on May 2, 1952 eliminated the requirement that every brief, except one filed in support of or in opposition to a motion, shall
contain a separate and particular statement of each point intended
to be urged with appropriate references to the specification of
points and that it shall contain the specification of points unless
it shall have been therefore filed separately. It added a sentence
reading that each such brief shall contain such appendices as are
proper under the Rules. And, in the place of the words "A con-,
cise summary of the argument," it used the phrase "A brief statement of the argument setting forth clearly and succinctly the
points to be argued." This last phrase was, by the amendment
adopted on November 12, 1952, replaced by "A concise summary
of the argument setting forth clearly and succinctly the grounds
relied on by the party presenting the brief as required by Rule
111 (f)." Such amendment also excepted from the operation of
this Rule briefs filed in support of or in opposition to an application
for supersedeas, in addition to the previous exception of briefs
filed in support of or opposition to a motion. It also added a requirement that references in the argument to material appearing
in an appendix shall be by appropriate page numbers. The reader
is referred to the complete text of this Rule which appears elsewhere in this issue.
Rule 115 (d)-Failureto File Brief; Effect of
By amendment adopted November 12, 1952, it was provided
that, if plaintiff in error neglects to file a brief as required, the
writ of error may not be dismissed without notice but, instead,
all interested parties whose appearances have been entered in the
Supreme Court are to be given an opportunity to file objections
to dismissal of the writ of error. The purpose of this amendment
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is the same as is stated in the discussion herein of a somewhat
similar amendment of Rule 111 (f) and reference is made to the
comments therein contained. Such amendment also eliminated the
reference to abstracts of record.
Rule 115 (e)-Time to File; Time for Filing
May Be Extended or Abridged by Court Only
This Rule was amended on November 12, 1952 by the addition of a provision that, if previous extensions of time for the performance of any act have been granted by the Court, the party
seeking a further extension shall include in his motion a statement setting forth all previous extensions and on whose application such extensions were granted. The purpose of the Court in
adopting this amendment has already been explained herein. Such
amendment also deletes the reference to the abstract of record.
Rule 115 (f)-Motions and Briefs Thereon
The only change made in this Rule was the addition of the
words "or mimeographed or otherwise reproduced in conformity
with the provisions of Rule 115 (h) with respect to briefs" after
the requirement that "All motions shall be typewritten." This
was to bring about conformity with the provisions of Rule 115 (h)
as amended.
Rule 115 (h)-Form of Briefs, Petitions and Motions
The amendment adopted November 12, 1952 made a number
of changes in this Rule. It included "Petitions" in the title of the
Rule in addition to Briefs and Motions. It provided that all motions and petitions must bear on the front cover the matter which
previously had been required to appear on the front cover of
abstracts of record and briefs. It deleted the reference to abstracts
of record. It added provisions that any brief of thirty-five pages
or less in length, including any appendix, whether filed separately
or not, and all briefs filed in support of or in opposition to an
application for supersedeas, or a motion, or under Rule 114 (b)
(proceeding by a poor person) or Rule 115 (k) (Industrial Commission cases), and all motions and petitions may be typewritten
or mimeographed or reproduced by some other method approved
by the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and that all such briefs shall
be plainly and distinctly legible, double spaced, and upon good
and durable paper eight and one-half inches by thirteen inches
and shall be bound at the top. It also made some changes in the
technical specifications for the printing of briefs. And it contained the provision which in 1948 was added to this Rule and
which read that briefs not in conformity with the Rule shall not
be accepted by the Clerk for filing except upon order of the Court.
Attorneys should bear in mind that, instead of having the
option of using paper that is either thirteen or fourteen inches
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long in briefs, motions and petitions that are not printed, they
may, under this amendment, use only thirteen inch paper. The
filing of these papers typewritten, mimeographed or otherwise
reproduced on fourteen inch paper is prohibited.
Attention is called to the warning contained earlier in this
article against filing carbon copies which are not clear and distinct.
Attention is also called to the fact that the thirty-five pages,
which must not be exceeded in the length of a brief if it is to be
typewritten or mimeographed or reproduced by some method other
than printing, include any appendix to such brief, whether filed
separately or not.
Rule 115 (i)-Number of Copies To Be Filed and Served
The amendments adopted on November 12, 1952 placed in
this Rule all of the provisions governing the number of copies of
all papers of every kind that are to be filed and that are to be
served on parties. Previously the provisions as to the number of
copies to be filed were scattered through a number of Rules. The
amendment of this Rule provides that ten copies of each motion,
petition, brief or other paper which is typewritten, mimeographed
or reproduced by some method other than printing are to be filed
and that fifteen copies of each thereof when printed shall be filed.
It further provides that two copies of each motion, petition, brief
or other paper shall be served upon all parties, except that in the
case of typewritten motions, briefs or other papers only one copy
need be served.
Rule 115 (j)-Withdrawal of Papers from Files
The amendment of this Rule merely, in conformity with the
amendments of other rules, states the purpose of withdrawal of
the record as being preparing briefs or appendices instead of
making abstracts.
Rule 115 (k)-Industrial Commission
This amendment added, after the word "typewritten," the
words "mimeographed or otherwise reproduced in conformity with
the provisions of Rule 115 (h)," in order to bring about conformity with said Rule 115 (h). It eliminated the provision as to the
number of copies of briefs in Industrial Commission cases that
are to be filed because that point is covered by Rule 115 (i) as
amended. And it deleted the provision that no abstract of record
is required in Industrial Commission cases because abstracts of
record have, by the amendments, been eliminated in all cases.
Rule 117-Oral Arguments
On December 13, 1951 the Supreme Court adopted an amendment, which was prepared by the Justices and which rewrote this
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Rule almost in its entirety. As so amended, this Rule provides
that, within fifteen days after an action becomes at issue in the
Supreme Court, either party may, by separate document, with
copy served on opposing party, request oral argument and that
the same will be permitted only by order of the Supreme Court
fixing the date thereof, of which counsel shall be notified by the
Clerk. It further provides that the. Court may, of its own motion,
order oral argument at any time. And it then contains provisions
which were in the Rule before its amendment to the effect that
oral arguments will be limited to thirty minutes to a side unless
the Court, by order, extends the time thereof and that the reading of written or printed arguments or lengthy citations will
pot be permitted. The full text of this Rule as so amended was
published on page 39 of the January 1952 issue of Dicta. Such
amendment became effective January 1, 1952.
Rule 118 (b)-Advancement on Docket
The only changes made in this Rule by the amendment adopted
November 12, 1952 were to delete the reference to abstract of
record and to add the words "mimeographed or otherwise reproduced" with reference to.briefs, in order to secure conformity
with the other amendments that were made at the same time.
Rule 118 (c)-Rehea,7ings
The Supreme Court by an amendment drafted by the Justices
and adopted November 15, 1951, applicable to all opinions announced on or after November 19, 1951, added four provisions
to this Rule. The first permitted the petition for rehearing to be
either printed or mimeographed or typewritten, instead of being
required to be printed in all cases except where the decision was
on application for supersedeas. The second was a prohibition of
more than three pages being contained in the petition for rehearing without consent of the Court. The third was a requirement
that seven legible copies thereof accompany the petition. And the
fourth was a provision that in no case will any argument be permitted in support of such petition. The full text of this amendment appeared on page 460 of the December 1951 issue of Dicta.
The Rule was further amended by the adoption on November
12, 1952 of an amendment prepared by the Rules Committee which,
consistent with the amendments of other Rules, added, after the
words "or typewritten" the phrase "or otherwise reproduced in
conformity with the provisions of Rule 115 (h) with respect to
briefs" and, because Rule 115 (i), as amended at the same time,
provided for the number of copies to be filed, it deleted the requirement that the petition for rehearing shall be accompanied
by seven legible copies thereof. Under the provisions of Rule 115
(i), as now amended, ten copies of a petition for rehearing are
required to be filed.

DICTA

Jan., 1953

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Adopted November 12, 1952

Effective February 12, 1953

Rule 59 (b)
(b) TIME FOR MOTION. A motion for a new trial shall
be filed not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment,
except that a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made after the expiration of such period
and before the expiration of 6 months after the entry of the judgment with leave of court obtained on notice and hearing and on
showing of due diligence. (Supplants Code Sec. 238)
Rule 111 (b)
(b) LIMITATION ON TIME OF ISSUANCE. No writ of
error shall be issued after 3 months from the entry of the judgment complained of in any case within paragraphs (1) or (2) of
subdivision (a) of this rule nor after 60 days from the entry of
the order complained of in any case within paragraphs (3) or
(4) of subdivision (a) of this rule; provided that in pending cases
within paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of
this rule, where the judgment sought to be reviewed became final
prior to the effective date of this proviso, the writ of error may
be issued within 12 months after the entry of the judgment, or
within 3 months from the effective date of this proviso, whichever
period expires first; and provided further that in special proceedings, where a different period is fixed by the applicable statute
for the issuance of a writ of error, the. statute shall control. (Supplants Supreme Court Rule 18 and Code Sec. 427. Also see 3
C. S. A., Chap. 97, Sec. 43.)
COMMITTEE NOTE:

-

As to special vroceedings, see Rule 81 (a) and Sitler v. Brians,
-----. Pac. (2d) ......
----Colo -- ----Rule 111 (c)

(c) HOW OBTAINED. To obtain a writ of error a party,
within the time fixed by this rule, shall docket the case in the
supreme court either by filing the record on error prepared in compliance with Rule 112 or by filing a praecipe for a writ of error.
There shall be filed at the time of such docketing a designation
of the parties which lists the names of the plaintiffs in error and
of the defendants in error. Where the record is not filed at the
time of the docketing, the. clerk of the supreme court shall issue
and transmit to the clerk of the trial court a writ of error commanding that the record on error shall be certified to the supreme
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court within sixty days from the receipt of such writ or within
such other or additional time as the supreme court may order and
the party seeking the writ of error shall do any and all things
necessary under Rule 112 to obtain such record on error. The
trial court shall have jurisdiction to make any and all orders relative to such record on error as may be proper under Rule 112
except that it may not extend the time for the doing of any act
pertaining to the preparation of such record on error, or any part
thereof, beyond the time fixed by the supreme court for the certification of such record on error to the supreme court. If, for
any reason, the record on error cannot be certified to the supreme
court within the time fixed by the supreme court or any extension
thereof, then, at the end of such time or extension, the clerk of
the trial court shall certify to the supreme court that the record
on error has not been made available for such certification, stating
the reasons therefor if known to him. A copy of such certificate
shall at the same time be served by the clerk of the trial court on
all interested parties in accordance with Rule 5. After receipt of
such certification the supreme court shall make whatever disposition of the writ of error or take whatever other action it deems
proper. Where the record on error is filed at the time of the
docketing, the clerk of the supreme court shall issue a writ of
error and shall file the same with the record of the case. (Part
new and part from Supreme Court Rule 19.)
COMMITTEE NOTE:

After the filing of the praecipe for writ of error within the
period allowed by Rule 111 (b), the 60 day period for filing the
record on error may be enlarged or extended by the supreme court
under Rule 6 (b).
Rule 111 (f)
(f) GROUND FOR REVERSAL, ETC. No assignments of
error, assignments of cross error or formal joinder in error, nor
any specification of points or cross specification of points shall be
filed. In lieu thereof each party in his brief in his summary of the
argument required by Rule 115 (c) shall state clearly and briefly
the grounds upon which he relies in seeking a reversal or modification of the judgment or the correction of adverse findings,
orders, or rulings of the trial court. He will be limited to the
grounds so stated although the court may in its discretion notice
any error appearing of record. When a writ of error has issued,
it shall not be dismissed upon motion of a plaintiff in error without notice to all interested parties whose appearances have been
entered in the supreme court, and order of the court permitting
such dismissal; if dismissal is objected to by any such interested
party, he may, in the court's discretion, seek reversal, modification, or correction of the judgment. (Supplants parts of Supreme
Court Rules 23, 27A, 29, 34 and all of 32, also Code Sec. 421.)
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RuIe 112 (e)
(e) AGREED STATEMENT:. When the questions presented
by a writ of error can be determined without an examination of
all the pleadings, evidence, and proceedings in the court below,
the parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case showing
how the questions arose and were decided in the trial court and
setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or
sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the questions
by the supreme court. The statement shall include a copy of the
judgment sought to be reviewed and a concise statement of the
grounds to be relied on by the plaintiff in error. If the statement
conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions as the
court may consider necessary fully to present the questions raised
by the writ of error, shall be approved by the trial court and shall
then be certified to the supreme court as the record on error.
(From Federal Rule 76.)
Rule 113 (a)
(a) APPLICATION FOR; AFTER RECORD FILED. Whenever plaintiff in error desires a stay of execution pending the determination of a writ of error, he may apply to the supreme
court for a supersedeas at any time after the filing therein of
the record prepared and certified in accordance with Rule 112.
A succinct brief shall be filed with such application for supersedeas
and served upon the defendant in error. Within 10 days after
such service the defendant in error may file and serve upon the
plaintiff in error a brief in opposition. The plaintiff in error may
reply thereto within 5 days from such service. The application
shall then stand submitted. Briefs filed under this rule may be
typewritten or mimeographed or otherwise reproduced, or at the
election of the party filing the same may be printed, in conformity
with Rule 115 (h). At the time of filing his first brief either party
may request a final determination of the controversy. Upon the
application for a supersedeas the court may affirm or reverse the
judgment. Pending the determination of an application for supersedeas, the court may order a stay of execution or make any
other order appropriate to preserve the status quo or to protect
the rights of the parties. (From Supreme Court Rules 22 and 23.)
Rule 114 (b)
(b) PROCEEDING BY A POOR PERSON. Any litigant
upon filing in the supreme court a motion under oath that because
Df his poverty he is unable to pay the fees in the supreme court,
and that he believes he is entitled to the redress he seeks by such
writ of error, and that sets forth briefly a statement of the grounds
on which he intends to rely, may, in the discretion of the court,
be permitted to prosecute a writ of error without being required
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to pay such fees or costs. If permission is granted, he may proceed on a brief that is typewritten or mimeographed or otherwise
reproduced in conformity with the provisions of Rule 115 (h).
(New.)
Rule 114 c)
(c) COSTS. Unless otherwise ordered the successful party
on writ of error shall recover as costs in the supreme court his
actual costs paid to the clerk of the supreme court, his expenses
actually and necessarily incurred in procuring the record on error
not exceeding thirty cents per folio, and, if, at the time the printed
abstract of record was filed, such abstract of record was required
by these rules to be filed, his expenses actually and necessarily
incurred for printing the abstract of record, not exceeding $2.75
per page. The supreme court may impose additional costs or order
the remission of costs. (From Supreme Court Rule 51.)
Rule 115. Briefs, Motions and Withdrawal of Papers
(a) STATEMENT OF CASE. No abstract of the record is
required. Plaintiff in error shall set forth in his brief a concise
statement of the case outlining the substance of the pleadings, the
facts based upon the evidence material to the decision of the case,
rulings of the trial court on the admissibility of evidence if objections were made and are relied upon, instructions given if essential
to a determination of the case, instructions refused if objections
to such refusals were made and are relied upon, any final opinion
of the trial court, any preliminary opinionof the trial court which
is material to the disposition of the case, the verdict or the findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the master's report if any, and the
rulings, orders, and judgment sought to be reviewed. Such statement shall be supported by specific references to folio numbers
of the record. It shall consist only of the essential facts and shall
not contain any argument relative to the evidence or law; provided, that in the interest of brevity a plaintiff in error may, if
he elects, cause any part or parts of the foregoing material to be
placed in an appendix to be filed as a part of, or separately from
but simultaneously with, his brief, in which event references
thereto in his brief shall be to both the folio numbers of the record
and the pages of the appendix. If the defendant in error disagrees
with the statement of the case by plaintiff in error, he shall set
forth in his brief in a supplemental statement each correction or
addition which he desires to make or considers material; and if
as provided in Rule 111 (f) he seeks a reversal or modification of
a judgment, or the correction of findings, orders, or rulings of
the trial court, he shall set forth such thereof as are not contained
in the brief or appendix of plaintiff in error. Defendant in error
may file an appendix if he so elects. The requirements of reference to folio numbers of the record, pages of the appendix, if any,
and the prohibition against argument shall be observed in any
supplemental statement of the case. (New.)
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Rule 115 (b)
(b) BRIEFS; WHEN FILED. Except as provided by Rule
118 (b) and subdivision (k) of this rule, the brief of plaintiff in
error shall be filed within 30 days after filing the record or, where
application for supersedeas is pending, within 30 days from the
date of the determination thereof unless the court makes final
determination of the case on such application for supersedeas. The
defendant in error shall file his brief within 30 days after service
upon him of copies of the brief of the plaintiff in error. The plaintiff in error may file a reply brief within 20 days after service of
the brief of the defendant in error upon him. Supplemental briefs
shall be filed only upon leave of court. (From Supreme Court
Rules 38 and 39 and Code Sec. 442.)
Rule 115 (c)
(c) BRIEFS; CONTENTS. Every brief filed in the supreme
court, except one filed in support of or in opposition to a motion
or an application for supersedeas shall contain separately in the
order following:
(1) A subject index of the entire brief.
(2) A table of all cases and statutes cited. Cases shall be
first stated in alphabetical order giving title, volume and page with
citations to the official reports and to the reporter system. Colorado statutes shall be cited by reference to official publication only.
Each case or statute shall be indexed to every page on which it
is cited.
(3) The statement of the case as required by subdivision (a)
of this rule.
(4) A concise summary of the argument setting forth clearly
and succinctly the grounds relied on by the party presenting the
brief as required by Rule 111 (f).
(5) The argument exhibiting clearly, separately, and without
unnecessary repetition the points of fact and law being presented
and citing the authorities and statutes relied upon. When other
than a Colorado statute is cited so much thereof as may be necessary to the decision shall be printed in full either in the body of
the argument or in an appendix. References to the record shall
be accompanied by appropriate folio numbers and references to
material appearing in an appendix shall be by appropriate page
numbers. When the reference is to the evidence, to the giving or
refusal to give an instruction, or to a ruling upon the report of
a master, the folio citation must be specific, and if the reference
is to an exhibit, both the folio number at which the exhibit appears and at which it was offered in evidence must be indicated.
(6) Such appendices as are proper under these rules.
Briefs of defendants in error need not contain a statement
of the case except under the circumstances provided for in Rule
115 (a). Reply briefs shall be confined strictly to answering new
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matters raised by the adversary's brief. (From Supreme Court
Rules 37 to 42, both inclusive. Also from Rule 27, U. S. Supreme
Court, and the rules of the U. S. Courts of Appeal.)
Rule 115 (d)
(d) FAILURE TO FILE BRIEF; EFFECT OF. If plaintiff
in error neglects to file a brief as required, the opposite party may
proceed ex parte, or, after giving all interested parties whose appearances have been entered in the supreme court an opportunity
to file objections to such dismissal, the court upon motion of a
party or upon its own motion may dismiss the writ of error. If
defendant in error fails to file his brief as required disposition
of the writ of error may be had ex parte. (From Supreme Court
Rules 34 and 40.)
Rule 115 (e)
(e) TIME TO FILE; TIME FOR FILING MAY BE EXTENDED OR ABRIDGED BY COURT ONLY. No stipulation or
motion shall suspend the operation of the rules, but for good cause
shown, the court, or a justice thereof in vacation, may extend or
abridge the time for filing briefs or other papers. If previous
extensions of time for the performance of any act have been
granted by the court, the party seeking a further extension shall
include in his motion a statement setting forth all previous extensions and on whose application such extensions were granted.
(From Supreme Court Rule 41.)
Rule 115 (f)
(f) MOTIONS AND BRIEFS THEREON. All motions shall
be typewritten or mimeographed or otherwise reproduced in conformity with the provisions of Rule 115 (h) with respect to briefs.
The party filing any such motions shall have 3 days in which to
file a brief in support thereof; the party opposing shall have 5
days after service thereof to answer, and 3 days shall then be
allowed after service for reply. The motion shall then stand submitted. (From Supreme Court Rule 46.)
Rule 115 (h)
(h) FORM OF BRIEFS, PETITIONS, AND MOTIONS. All
motions, petitions, and briefs shall bear, on the front cover, the
number and title of the case, the court to which the writ of error
lies, the name of the trial judge, and the names and addresses
of the abtorneys filing the same. Any brief of 35 pages or less
in length, including any appendix whether filed separately or not,
and all briefs filed in support of or in opposition to an application
for supersedeas, or a motion, or under Rules 114 (b) or 115 (k),
and all motions and petitions may be typewritten or mimeographed
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or reproduced by some other method approved by the clerk of
the supreme court, provided that all such briefs shall be plainly
and distinctly legible, double spaced, and upon good and durable
paper eight and one-half inches by thirteen inches and shall be
bound at the top. Except as otherwise provided, all briefs shall
be printed and shall be on opaque and unglazed paper. They shall
be printed on pages nine and one-quarter inches by six and oneeighth inches when trimmed, in plain face eleven or twelve point
type adequately leaded, with type matter four and one-sixteenth
by seven and one-sixteenth inches. Extract and quotations must
be in the same type indented by two ems. All printed briefs shall
be bound on the left hand side. Motions, petitions, and briefs not
in conformity herewith may not be accepted by the clerk for filing
except on order of the court. (New.)
Rule 115 (i)
(i) NUMBER OF COPIES TO BE FILED AND SERVED.
Ten copies of each motion, petition, brief, or other paper which is
typewritten, mimeographed or reproduced by some method other
than printing, and fifteen copies of each thereof when printed
shall be filed. Two copies of each motion, petition, brief, or other
paper shall be served upon all parties except that in the case of
typewritten motions, briefs, or other papers only one copy need
be served. Proof of service shall be filed with the clerk. No such
service shall be required upon a defendant in error who has not
entered his appearance in the supreme court as stated in the
summons to hear errors, but in lieu of such service one additional
copy of each such paper shall be filed. (From Supreme Court
Rules 38 and 46.)
Rule 115 (j)
(j) WITHDRAWAL OF PAPERS FROM FILES. No paper
shall be taken from the files, without leave of court, except the
record, which may be withdrawn by counsel for 20 days for the
purpose of preparing briefs or appendices. Every paper taken
from the files must be retained in the custody of the party withdrawing it and must not be in any manner mutilated, taken apart,
cut or marked. (From Supreme Court Rule 47.)
Rule 115 (k)
(k) INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. On motion for writs of
error in cases determined by the Industrial Commission the record of the proceedings before the commission shall be arranged in
chronological order, omitting all duplicates, with folio numbers
on the left margin, and a table of contents, which shall refer to
the folio numbers. Briefs may be printed, typewritten, mimeographed or otherwise reproduced in conformity with the provisions of Rule 115 (h). Within 15 days after issuance of the writ
plaintiff in error shall file his brief; within 10 days after service
thereof upon him defendant in error shall file his brief, and within
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5 days after service thereof upon him plaintiff in error may file
a reply brief. Such cases shall not be argued orally except upon
order of the court. (From Supreme Court Rules 44A and 45.)
Rule 118 (b)
(b) ADVANCEMENT ON DOCKET. Any pending action
may be advanced on the docket and may be disposed of in such
order as the court shall determine. In matters of great public
importance the court may make such orders relating to the time
and necessity for the filing of printed, typewritten, mimeographed
or otherwise reproduced briefs, and the time and necessity for
oral argument as it deems the circumstances demand. (From Code
Secs. 329 and 330.)
Rule 118 (c)
(c) REHEARINGS. A petition for rehearing shall bear the
cover endorsement prescribed in Rule 115 (h), the name of the
justice who wrote the opinion, and shall state whether the decision was en banc or in department. It may be filed within 15 days
after the filing of the opinion of the court, and shall briefly state
the points claimed to have been overlooked or misapprehended
by the court with proper references to the particular portion of
the record and briefs relied upon. Such petition may be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten or otherwise reproduced in conformity with the provisions of Rule 115 (h) with respect to briefs,
and shall not contain more than three pages without consent of
the court. In no case will any argument be permitted in support
of such petition. If argumentative matter is contained therein, the
petition may be stricken. No answer will be permitted and no
action will be taken save to grant or deny the rehearing. The filing
of such petition shall suspend proceedings under the decision until
the petition is disposed of, unless the court shall direct otherwise.
(From Supreme Court Rules 48 and 49.)

It isn't the critic who counts, not the man who points out
how the strong man stumbled, where the doer of deeds could have
lone better; the credit belongs to the man who is actually in the
arena, whose face is marred with sweat and dust and blood, who
strives valiantly, who errs and comes short again and again; because there is no effort without error and shortcoming. But who
knows the great enthusiasms, the great emotions, who spends himself in worthy cause, who at the best knows at the end the triumph of high achievement and who at the worst, if he fails, at
least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be
with those cold and dead souls who know neither victory nor defeat.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

DICTA

Jan., 1953

VARIATIONS IN COLORADO AND FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LAWS
EDWARD P. KURZ *
Certified Public Accontant

While the United States Income Tax Laws were used as a
model for the Colorado Income Tax Acts, there are a number of
differences between the laws in effect today. Certain of these differences are not included here as they are considered beyond the
scope of this article because of their limited application, the extent
of the differences, or the complications involved.
The basic date of the Federal law is March 1, 1913, while the
basic date of the Colorado law is July 1, 1937.
ALIMONY

Alimony and separate maintenance payments pursuant to a
divorce or legal separation and qualifying as "periodic payments"
(generally payable over a period of more than ten years) are
deductible by the payor and includible in the payee's income. However, any amount payable for the support of minor children of
the payor is not deductible, neither is it income to the payee (sec.
22(k), 23(u), I. R. C.)
Sec. 3797(a) (17), I. R. C., provides that the law can be applied reciprocally to allow a wife deduction for payment of alimony
in the husband's
LU a husband, and to include such payments
income.
There are no comparable provisions in the Colorado law. Art.
6(a) (1), Colorado Regulations (hereinafter referred to as Colo.
Reg.) provides that "attorney's fees paid in a suit for separation,
alimony, and all allowance paid under a separation agreement are
not deductible from gross income." Art. 4(b) (3), Colo. Reg., provides that "neither alimony nor an allowance based on a separation
agreement is taxable income."
ALLOCATION OF INCOME

Art. 16, 17, 18, Colo. Reg., set forth the methods of allocation
of income in the case of non-resident taxpayers whose gross income is from sources in part within and in part without the state.
There are no comparable provisions in the Federal Law.
ALTERNATIVE TAX

Sec. 117(c), I. R. C., provides for an alternative tax computation so that the total effective income tax on the excess of. net
long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss will not
exceed 26% of such excess. There are no alternative tax provisions in the Colorado law.
AMORTIZATION OF BOND PREMIUM

Amortization of bond premium on fully tax-exempt bonds is
mandatory but is not an allowable deduction, the amortization
simply lowering the basis of the bond. Amortization of bond
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
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premium on fully taxable bonds is elective and the amortization
is applicable both as an adjustment to the basis and as a deduction in the current year. In the case of partially tax-exempt bonds,
amortization is mandatory as to corporations but is elective in
the case of other taxpayers. If the accrual basis of accounting is
used for income tax purposes, amortization is required for every
taxable year for which interest on the bond is accruable (sec. 125,
I. R. C.).
Art. 15(d) (1), Colo. Reg., deals only with amortization of
bond premium on bonds the interest from which is taxable under
Colorado law. This includes municipal bonds and corporate bonds
for all taxpayers, and for banks it includes bonds issued by the
United States, its agencies and instrumentalities, as interest thereon is included in the measure of tax imposed upon them. This
article provides that amortization is elective and is deductible
from gross interest income.
BAD DEBTS-NON-BUSINESS

Sec. 23(k) (4), I. R. C., provides that the loss resulting from
non-business debts (other than any debt evidenced by a security)
which become entirely worthless within the taxable year shall be
considered as a short term capital loss. Thus, the limitations on
capital losses later considered are applicable.
Art. 5 (i)-1, Colo. Reg., does not provide for any special treatment of non-business bad debts. They are deductible as "miscellaneous" or "other deductions" on page 3, Form 104, if the standard deduction is not used.
CAPITAL ASSETS

In sec. 117 (a), I. R. C., capital assets are defined as property
held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade
or business) but does NOT include(a) inventoriable assets;
(b) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(c) depreciable business property;
(d) real property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer;
(e) certain government obligations issued at a discount and
maturing within one year of issue; and
(f) certain copyrights or artistic compositions, etc.
However, sec. 117(j), I. R. C., provides in effect that gains or
losses from transactions covered by that section shall be treated
as gains and losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets
held for more than six months if the aggregate of such gains exceeds the aggregate of such losses. If the aggregate of such gains
does not exceed the aggregate of such losses, such gains and losses
shall not be treated as gains and losses from the sale or exchange
of capital assets. Sec. 117(j), I. R. C., deals with gains and losses
arising from(a) sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion, of land (in-
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cluding in certain cases unharvested crops sold with the land)
and depreciable property used in the trade or business and held
for more than six months;
(b) sale, exchange or involuntary conversion of livestock
held for draft, breeding, or dairy purposes (but not including
poultry). and held for one year or more;
(c) the cutting of timber or the disposal of timber or coal
to which sec. 117 (k), I. R. C., applies; and
(d) the involuntary conversion of capital assets held more
than six months.
Art. 15 (b), Colo. Reg., defines capital assets as property held
by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business) but not including inventoriable assets or property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of his trade or business. It specifically includes livestock held for
draft, breeding, or dairy purposes. Thus, in the computation of
capital gains and losses for -Colorado purposes you may include
transactions not included for Federal purposes.
As to corporations, under' both laws, the entire gain or loss
is recognized upon the sale or exchange of capital assets, except
that the alternative tax provisions are available to corporations
in the computation of federal income tax. Note that the old rule
still applies in Colorado.
CAPITAL Loss LIMITATIONS
In the case of taxpayers other than a corporation, the deductible capital loss is limited to $1,000 in excess of the capital gains.
Any non-deductible excess of capital losses may be carried forward
by all taxpayers, including corporations, into the next five succeeding years (sec. 117 (d), (e), I. R. C.).
However, under Colorado law (art. 15(d), Colo. Reg.) the
total deductible loss from the sales or exchange of capital assets
of all taxpayers, including corporations, cannot exceed $2,000.
There is no provision in the Colorado law for "carry-over losses."
CASUALTY LOSSES

Certain involuntary conversions receive sec. 117(j), I. R. C.,
treatment. The Revenue Act of 1951 permits the use of a casualty
loss in computation of a net operating loss, even though the casualty loss is on non-business property (sec. 23 (e), I. R. C.). There
are no comparable Colorado provisions.
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

Under sec. 23(o), I. R. C., the charitable contributions deduction by individuals may not exceed 20% of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income, unless the provisions of sec. 120, I. R. C.,
are applicable. The deduction by a corporation is limited to 5%
of its net income computed without the contributions deduction
(sec. 23(q), I. R. C.). The contributions must be actually paid
within the taxable year to be deductible, except that a corporation
on the accrual basis may deduct contributions authorized by the
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board of directors in the taxable year if paid before the 15th
day of the third month following the close of the taxable year.
Under art. 5(m), Colo. Reg., deductible contributions in the
case of an individual may not exceed 15%, and in the case of a
corporation 5% of the taxpayer's net income as computed without
the benefit of the contributions deduction. In all cases, the contributions must be actually paid during the taxable year to be
deductible.
CREDITS AGAINST TAX

Credits for foreign income taxes paid are dealt with in sec.
131, I. R. C. State income taxes are deductible from income prior
to computation of tax.
No credit against the Colorado income tax is allowed for
income taxes paid to the United States or any foreign country or
any city nor for any so-called "gross income taxes" which some
states impose. These may be taken as deductions in a proper case
but are not allowed as credits. The provisions of art. 31, Colo.
Reg., are limited to the amount of net income taxes paid by an
individual resident of Colorado to another state, the District of
Columbia, a territory or possession of the United States and allow
a credit against the Colorado tax of the smallest of the three
following amounts:
(1) The amount of net income tax paid or accrued to another
state.
(2) Credit is to Colorado tax as other state net income is to
total net income.
(3) Credit is to Colorado tax as out of Colorado net income
is to total net income.
No credit can be taken if the standard deduction is claimed.
DECEDENTS

This topic is covered in Day, Income Taxes During Estate
Administration, 29 DICTA 19 (1952).
In general, under federal law the accounts of the decedent are
closed as if it were for a regular taxable year of the decedent, i.e.
his regular method of accounting would determine whether the
cash or accrual method would be required. Also, the standard
deduction or tax table may be used.
Art. 8(b) -1, Colo. Reg., provides that the final return of a
decedent must include all items of income and expense accrued
as of date of death, including the deduction for federal income
tax. Art. 5(n) (5), Colo. Reg., provides that the standard deduction cannot be taken on a return for a deceased person.
DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL GAINS DIVIDENDS

A capital
ing to tax on
recipient as a
Art. 2(a)
gain dividend

gain dividend, as defined in sec. 362, I. R. C. (relatregulated investment companies), is treated by the
long-term capital gain.
(2)a, Colo. Reg., provides that "there is no capital
recognized in the Act."
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ESTATES AND TRUSTS-65 DAY RULE
A distribution during the first 65 days of a taxable year of
income of a prior period, in a case where payment may be made
from income only, is considered to be paid, credited, or to be distributed on the last day of the preceding taxable year, to the extent
of the income for the part of such period not falling within the
taxable year (sec. 162, I. R. C.). There is no comparable Colorado
provision.
This rule was commented upon in Day, Income Taxes During
Estate Administration, 29 DICTA 19, 23 (1952).
ESTATES AND TRUSTS-EXEMPTIONS

Sec. 163(a) (1), I. R. C., provides for an exemption of $600
for an estate but an exemption of $100 for a trust.
Art. 7(a)-2, Colo. Reg., provides for an exemption of $600
for an estate or a trust.
ESTIMATED TAX DECLARATIONS

Sec. 58(a), I. R. C., provides that certain individuals must
file declarations of estimated tax. This is to provide for current
payment of taxes not collected through withholding. There is no
comparable Colorado provision. In fact, payments of Colorado
income tax will not be accepted prior to the end of the taxable year.
EXCESS PROFITS TAX

For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to say that the
United States Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950 applies only to corporations, applies only to taxable years ending after June 30, 1950
and will expire as of June 30, 1953 unless extended by law. There
are no comparable Colorado provisions.
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD
The Revenue Act of 1951 provides special tax treatment for
any individual who qualifies as a "Head of a Household." The
head of a household is an unmarried individual, other than a nonresident alien, who maintains at his home a household constituting
the principal place of abode, as a member of such household, of
one or more of the following(a) any person for whom the taxpayer is entitled to an exemption, or
(b) an unmarried child, grandchild, or stepchild, even though
such child is not a dependent.
The taxpayer must furnish over one-half of the cost of maintaining the home during the taxable year.
There are no comparable Colorado provisions.
IMPROPER ACCUMULATIONS OF SURPLUS

The surtax on improper accumulations of surplus (271/2% on
the first $100,000 of "undistributed sec. 102 net income" and 381/2 %
on the remainder of "undistributed sec. 102 net income") may be
applied to any corporation (domestic or foreign) which permits
earnings or profits to be accumulated instead of being distributed,

Jan., 1953

DICTA

for the purpose of avoiding the individual surtax on its shareholders or on the shareholders of any other corporation (sec. 102,
I. R. C.). There are no comparable provisions in the Colorado law.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF TAXES

Advance payments by way of withholding and estimated
declarations are required in the case of individuals, any balance
due being payable on or before the 15th day of the third month
after the close of the taxable year. A decedent's estate may pay
its tax in four equal installments. The privilege of paying tax by
installments has been eliminated in the case of trusts. Corporate
taxes are payable on an accelerated basis each year so that for
a taxable year ending in 1955 or thereafter only two 50% payments will be made, one with the return and the other in the
second quarter.
Art. 24(a), Colo. Reg., provides that any taxpayer may elect
to pay his tax in four equal installments on or before the 15th
day of the fourth, seventh, tenth and twelfth month after the close
of the taxable year.
INTEREST INCOME

All interest received or accrued except in the case of state or
municipal obligations and a few United States obligations issued
prior to March 1, 1941 is fully taxable (sec. 22(b) (4), I. R. C.).
Art. 4(b), Colo. Reg., provides that interest derived from
obligations of the United States, and its possessions, agencies and
instrumentalities is exempt from Colorado tax. However, in accordance with art. 2(e), Colo. Reg., this does not apply to banks.
All interest received is taxable to banks.
JOINT RETURNS-INCOME

SPLITTING

A husband and wife may elect to file a joint return combining their income and deductions. This may be done even where
one spouse has no gross income (sec. 51 (b) (1), 1. R. C., art. 19 (a)1, Colo. Reg.).
The Colorado law has no provision comparable to the incomesplitting provisions of the federal law. The federal law permits
a surviving spouse to file a joint return with the deceased spouse
in the year of death, but the Colorado law specifically prohibits
same. The Revenue Act of 1951 allows taxpayers who have filed
separate returns to elect at any time within three years to substitute joint returns, while the Colorado law does not permit a change
of mind once the time for filing a return has expired.
LIVESTOCK

Livestock held for draft, breeding, or dairy purposes are not
capital assets under federal law (sec. 117(a), I. R. C.) but are
treated as sec. 117(j), I. R. C., assets, and are now required to
be held for one year or more to receive such treatment.
Under Colorado law (art. 15(b), Colo. Reg.) livestock held
for draft, breeding, or dairy purposes are capital assets and are
only required to be held for six months or more to receive capital
gains treatment.
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MEDICAL EXPENSES

Under both the federal law (sec. 23(x), I. R. C.) and the
Colorado law (art. 5(p), Colo. Reg.), a deduction is allowed to
every individual (residents only for Colorado tax) for expenses
paid during the taxable year for medical care of the taxpayer,
his spouse, or a dependent of the taxpayer, but only such amount
of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income and not
as exceeds 5
to exceed $1250 per individual exemption (not for "over 65" or
blindness exemptions), $2,500 per separate return or $5,000 per
joint return. However, the Revenue Act of 1951 removed the 51'
limitation (for federal returns only) for both the taxpayer and
his spouse (but not for medical expenses as to their dependents)
if either husband or wife attained age 65 before the end of the
taxable year.
NET OPERATING Loss DEDUCTION

A "net operating loss" from a trade or business may be carried back to the first preceding taxable year as a deduction against
that year's income, the excess loss, if any not absorbed, may then be
carried to the next five succeeding taxable years. The Revenue
Act of 1951 allows all casualty losses to be considered in computing the net operating loss whether or not the property destroyed or damaged was used in the individual's trade or business
(sec. 122, I. R. C.). There are no comparable provisions in the
Colorado law.
MILITARY EXEMPTIONS

Under sec. 22(b) (13), I. R. C., all service pay received by an
enlisted man or warrant officer for any part of a month during
which he was in service in a combat area is exempted from tax.
The exemption for a commissioned officer is $200 in service pay
for any part of a month during which he was in a combat area.
The Revenue Act of 1951 extended these exemptions to include the
compensation of military personnel received while hospitalized as
a result of wounds, disease, or injury incurred while serving in a
combat zone.
Colorado law (art. 4(b) (8), Colo. Reg.) excluded the first
$2,000 of compensation received from the United States Government for each taxable year by any member of the Armed Forces.
Included in the term compensation is mustering out pay and all
payments made by the United States Government to dependents
of the taxpayer.
NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

For purposes of this article, it is sufficient to say that art.
3-2, Colo. Reg., was amended by COLO. LAWS, c. 47, p. 122 (1952)
so that only religious organizations and insurance companies are
not required to file annual returns. All other exempt organizations
must file annual returns with the Colorado Department of Revenue.
Under federal law (sec. 101, I. R. C.) all exempt organizations
are required to file annual returns.

Jan., 1953

DICTA

OPTION-FAILURE TO EXERCISE

Sec. 117 (g), I. R. C., provides that a gain or loss attributable
to failure to exercise a privilege or option to buy or sell property
is considered as a short-term capital gain or loss.
Art. 5(d)-1, Colo. Reg., states that no deductible loss occurs
from the payment of a sum of money for an option to purchase
property where the option was not exercised unless the transaction was connected with a trade or business or entered into for
profit. Where there is a profit in the non-exercise of an option
presumably there is taxable income.
PERCENTAGE DEPLETION

The method of computing allowable percentage depletion is
similar under both laws (sec. 114(b), I. R. C., art. 12(c), Colo.
Reg.). However, while the percentages provided for oil, gas, and
coal are the same under both laws, there is a substantial difference in the percentages provided for other minerals.
PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANIES

For purposes of this article, it will suffice to say that in addition to the regular corporate normal tax and surtax, a special
surtax is imposed on the "undistributed subchapter A net income"
of a personal holding company at the rate of 75% of the amount
not in excess of $2,000 plus 85% of the amount in excess of $2,000.
Those practitioners doing corporate work should become intimately
familiar with sec. 501, I. R. C., and subsequent sections. There
are no comparable Colorado provisions.
RETURNS ON LIQUIDATION OF CORPORATIONS

Sec. 29.148-2, Reg. 111, provides that within 30 days after
adoption of a resolution or plan of dissolution or liquidation of
all or part of its capital stock, a corporation must file an information return on Form 966. In addition, Form 1099L must be filed
by February 28 of the following year.
Art. 19(b) -1, Colo. Reg., provides that upon liquidation or
dissolution of a corporation there shall be attached to the final
return a Form DR 166 D-1-A giving certain information with
reference to the dissolution or liquidation.
RETURN REQUIRED AFTER REVENUE AGENT'S EXAMINATION

Art. 19 (e), Colo. Reg., provides that the taxpayer whose federal income tax return has been changed by competent authority
must notify the Colorado Department of Revenue of such change
in net income within 30 days after the final determination thereof,
and the Statute of Limitation shall not apply in the instance of
any taxpayer who fails to make a report within the time specified.
There are no comparable federal provisions.
SALE OF RESIDENCE

The Revenue Act of 1951 provided for the allowing of a postponement of the recognition of gain on the sale of a taxpayer's
residence under certain circumstances (sec. 112(n), I. R. C.). The
new provision treats an involuntary conversion as a sale, and provides that in such cases the new provision, and not sec.112(f),
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I. R. C., is to apply. This new treatment only applies to sales of
a taxpayer's principal residence made after 1950.
The Colorado law was amended in 1952 (CoLO. LAWS, c. 47,
p. 124) (1952) to provide similar treatment for Colorado income
tax purposes. However, it only applies where both the sale and
purchase is of Colorado property.
SOCIAL SECURITY

The Bureau of Internal Revenue has ruled that payments made
under sec. 202 of the Social Security Act are exempt from federal
income tax (I. T. 3447, 1941). However, art. 4(a) -16(d), Colo.
Reg., provides that "Old Age Retirement Benefits and Unemployment Compensation payments constitute income taxable under the
income tax law of Colorado. Payments made by an employee under
that law are deductible.. .
STANDARD DEDUCTION

On a final return of a decedent, sec. 29.23 (aa) -1(a), Reg. 111,
provides that the standard deduction may be taken, while art.
5(n) (5), Colo. Reg., provides that it cannot be taken.
The election to take the standard deduction in lieu of actual
deductions is binding and irrevocable per art. 5(n) (3), Colo. Reg.
However, the Revenue Act of 1951 provided for the revocation of
an election to take the standard deduction or to itemize deductions
on the Federal income tax return. To result in a refund or credit,
a change of election will have to be filed within the applicable
period of limitations (sec. 23(aa) (7), I. R. C.).
While the optional standard deduction under federal law is
10% of the adjusted gross income or $1,000 whichever is less, the
deduction under Colorado law is 10% of the adjusted gross income
or $1,000 whichever is less, plus the federal income tax deduction.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Generally, under federal law (sec. 275, I. R. C.) income taxes
must be assessed within three years from the date the return was
filed, except that if the return was filed prior to the due date the
three year period commences on the due date. If an amount in
excess of 25% of the gross income reported has been omitted from
the return, the limitation is five years. In case of a failure to file
a return or in a case of a false or fraudulent return, there is no
statute of limitations.
Art. 29, Colo. Reg., provides generally for a four year statute
of limitations on additional assessment, except that the period is
increased to six years if a deficiency exceeds by 25% the amount
of net income shown on the return. In a case of failure to file a
return or in a case of a false or fraudulent return the tax may be
assessed at any time.
On claims for refunds, the federal law (sec. 322, I. R. C.)
provides that the claims must be filed within three years from the
due date of the return or two years from the date of payment of
the tax, whichever is later. Art. 29, Colo. Reg., provides that a
claim must be filed within four years from the date of the last
payment on account of the tax for the year in question.
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SURTAX-COLORADO

Art 2(a) (2) a, Colo. Reg., imposes a two percent surtax on
natural persons upon such income as exceeds $600 which consists
of or is derived from dividends and interest. This surtax is in
addition to the normal tax. Thus, it is possible to be subject to
the surtax and not to the normal tax as no deductions are permitted
from surtaxable income.
There are no comparable federal provisions.
STOCK OPTIONS-EMPLOYEES

Special treatment is provided for "restricted stock options"
granted to employees by corporations. Detailed rules are provided,
but generally, the option price must be at least 85% of the market price at the time the option is granted and if the employee
holds the stock until at least two years after he receives the option
and six months after he receives the stock he is deemed to realize
no taxable income upon exercise of the option (sec. 130A, I. R. C.).
There are no comparable Colorado provisions.
TAX DEDUCTION
Whereas under federal law, the deduction for taxes paid is
determined by the accounting method used by the taxpayer, art.
8(b)-5, Colo. Reg., permits the accrual basis taxpayer to elect to
deduct federal income taxes on either the cash or accrual basis.
The election once made is binding for all future years. The election was or is made on the first return filed after 1942.
TRAVEL

TO AND FROM WORK

Art. 4(a) (1), Colo. Reg., provides that actual expenses paid
in traveling to and from the place or places of employment are
deductible in arriving at adjusted gross income. A deduction of
$75 is permitted in lieu of itemizing travel expenses. There are
no comparable federal provisions.
UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME OF TAX EXEMPTS

Certain organizations exempt from income tax under sec. 101,
1. R. C., are now subject to income tax on income from operation
of a business enterprise which is unrelated to the purpose for
which such an organization received its exemption (sec. 421,
I. R. C., and subsequent sections). There are no comparable Colorado provisions.
As previously stated, this article is not all-inclusive of the
differences between the Colorado and federal income tax laws.
However, it would be of great value to all tax practitioners to
have a publication which would tell quickly in general terms what
the Colorado law provides and which would also tell whether the
Colorado provision is the same as the federal or whether there is
a difference. Included therein could be cross reference tables so
that knowing the applicable section of one law you could consult
the tables for the comparable section in the other law. It is hoped
that some group or groups will undertake the preparation of such
a publication.
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ON "QUALIFYING" PENSION PLANS
EDWix M.

ad

Si-EARS of the Denver Bar

Instructor. Unive'rsity of Den ver College of Law

The renewed interest of businessmen in pension plans for their
employees again demands the lawyer's attention. It is the purpose
of this paper to supplement my previous article on this subject in
Dicta.' confining myself here to the narrow problem of "qualifying the plan."
First, however, I should restate some of the reasons for employers' interest in pension plans.
(a) The employer's contributions to a qualified plan are,
within the limits set by Section 23(p), I. R. C., deductible from
gross income. With the return of the excess profits tax on corporations, a "contribution-dollar" may therefore cost a corporate
employer as little as 18¢.2
(b) The employer's contribution to a qualified trust is not
"income" to the employee, though the pension itself is income to
him when received by him.
(c) A pension plan may be so drawn as to be exempt from
salary and wage stabilization restrictions.
(d) The goodwill and increased work-enthusiasm of employees, produced by a pension plan, may be worth a great deal
to the employer, yet, cannot be measured in dollars and cents.
(e) The "contribution-dollar," already reduced in cost by the
tax feature, 4 may actually cost the employer even less, and may
cost a corporate employer nothing. The reason why this can happen is this: in a corporation, even a closed corporation, stockholders who are also employees may participate in the plan. The
cash values or funds accumulated in the pension fund for the
benefit of stockholders-employees in effect diminish and may totally
offset the cost of the "contribution-dollars."
2. Where the plan takes the form of a trust, as it usually
does and usually should do, general trust law, e.g. regarding the
settlor, beneficiary, trustee, the trust res, and possibly 5 the rule
against perpetuities, must be complied with.
It is obviously impossible in this article to cover all the trust
rules that may be involved, and I can only refer the reader to
the well-known texts by Scott and Bogert. The latter has a sample pension trust in Section 1124 (a) which to some may, though
it should not, obviate reading of the preceding 1123 sections.
A warning is in order against the tendency of neglecting trust
law over the understandable desire to comply with the tax rules.
In the following situation such neglect may be fatal under both.
Under Section 23(p) (1) (E), I. R. C., proper contributions
'September, 1943, pp. 223 et seq.
'Or 30c if the overall tax limit of 70% is considered.
3General Salary Regulation 6; General Wage Regulation 21.
4 Supra, (a).
5
Not now in Colorado: CoLo. STAT. AN.N,., Chapter 40, Section 9 (2).
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to a qualified pension trust are deductible "in the taxable year
when paid," and
a taxpayer on the accrual basis shall be deemed to have
made a payment on the last day of the year of accrual
if the payment is on account of such taxable year and is
made within sixty days after the close of the taxable year
of accrual.
Now, assume a taxpayer on the accrual and calendar year basis.
A pension trust instrument is executed on December 31, 1950,
and it is provided that payment of the contribution must be made
within sixty days. The taxpayer does make the payment within
the sixty days, and deducts it on his 1950 tax return. This seems
at first glance perfectly proper. But on more careful consideration, there appears the serious question whether a trust exists
at all in 1950. A trust res is necessary to create a valid trust in
Colorado,6 and a valid trust in 1950 is a prerequisite for a deductible contribution to such trust on the 1950 tax return. It might be
argued that the "claim" of the trust against the taxpayer constitutes the trust res until it has actually been paid. The difficulty
with this argument is, however, the fact that the trust instrument
usually does not so state, and that the Commissioner may not recognize such claim as a sufficient trust res for tax purposes. 7 The trouble
of the taxpayers involved in the citations just preceding would have
been avoided had the trust law been more carefully consulted.
3. It is however true that the drafter of a pension trust has
an invisible collaborator looking over his shoulder in the Commissioner of Internal Revenue who, applying and interpreting
section 165, I. R. C., tells the draftsman what to put in or leave
out of such trust, if it, and contributions to it, are to be tax-exempt.
(a) A plan is tax-exempt under the following conditions :8
(aa) There must be a written pension plan which is definite
and is communicated to the employee. The plan need not be, but
may be, separate from and in addition to the trust agreement.
Where a separate "plan" and "trust" are drawn, it should be stated
which of the two is to control in case of conflict.
(bb) The plan must be for the exclusive benefit of, i.e. for
the ultimate distribution to, the employees or their beneficiaries.
In order to have clear terminology it is advisable to call the employees covered by the plan "participants" and reserve the term
"beneficiaries" to the objects of the participants' bounty.
(cc) Section 165 (a) (3) (A), I. R. C., prescribes certain
percentages of employees which seemingly must be met to qualify
a pension trust as tax-exempt. But many qualified trusts do not
meet these percentages. They must then qualify under Section
165(a) (3) (B), i.e. they must set up a classification "found by
IBank of America v. Scully, 92 F. 2d 97 (10th Cir. 1937) ; Scott Section 2.6;
Section 66.
1C. C. H., Income Tax Service, Section 1150 E. 92; Section 338.04; Section
9,38.42.
SSection 165 (a), I. R. C.
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the Commissioner not to be discriminatory" in favor of officers,
stockholders, supervisors and high-priced employees. Few lawyers
will have the nerve of installing a pension trust without asking
the Commissioner's prior approval, though the law does not generally require it. Qualifying the eligibility schedule therefore is
no additional burden, and such qualification often is obtained for
a plan not even close to the percentages in Sec. 165 (a) (3) (A),
I. R. C.
(dd) The plan must not discriminate in favor of key employees (officers, etc.). This requirement is not the same as that
in (cc), above. There the question is eligibility in the abstract.
The question here is the actual results in the operation of a plan.
(b) The law expressly states that a plan shall not be considered discriminatory merely because it is limited to, or favors,
employees with incomes exceeding those covered by the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act, or is limited to salaried or clerical
employees, and for other stated reasons. The emphasis here is
on the "merely." The Commissioner, in point of fact, does not
acknowledge a classification excluding F. I. C. A.-covered incomes
as non-discriminatory unless benefits receivable under the plan
and under the Federal Social Security program are integrated
according to a rather complicated formula. 10 The purpose of the
integration formula is to assure that no high-priced employee can
receive a greater retirement benefit in the proportion to pay than
the excluded employees.
The Commissioner further requires a good reason for limiting a plan to clerical and salaried employees, though the law declares such classification not to be in itself discriminatory. A good
reason for such classification usually is recognized where the nonclerical employees are unionized and clerical employees are not.
Regulation 111, Section 29.165-3, adds that classifications according to age, years of service, or departments are not in themselves discriminatory.
(c) A few important developments or considerations in the
tax treatment of pension trusts deserve special mention.
(aa) The Commissioner had previously ruled that no plan
was acceptable where 30% or more of the employer's contribution benefited employees holding 10% or more, each, of the employer's stock. This ruling greatly reduced the availability of
pension plans in closed corporations. In the Volekening case "I the
tax court struck that rule down. Under that case, pension plans
using even 60% of the contribution for the benefit of large stockholders may therefore now qualify if otherwise non-discriminatory.
(bb) A pension trust may be made revocable at will. But
revocation of the trust within a short time after its inception, or
after benefits to key employees have been funded will be taken
as evidence of lack of a bona fide plan for its inception, unless
9Section 165 (a) (5).
10Reg. 111, Section 29.165-3; Minn. 5539; Section 1150 E. 46, C. C. H.
1113 T. C. 94; C. C. H. Dec. 17, 277.
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business necessity causes the termination. 1 2 But the Tax Court
has held that if there is any good reason, the plan may be abandoned without tax penalty, even after only one year of operation."
(cc) Perhaps the most important single element in pension
trust militating against their wider use by business is the necessity of regular, predetermined contributions, regardless of profits
made, and even if a loss is incurred. The risk therein is partly
eliminated through the carryback and carryover provisions of
Section 122, I. R. C., which put every business on a long range
business cycle, permitting, to some extent, the equalization of
losses in one year against profit in others. But this is hardly sufficient to reassure the cautious businessman. Attempts have therefore been made to devise plans which would require contributions
in good years only. Many lawyers, including this writer, combined
a pension with a profit sharing trust. Contributions to a profit
sharing trust need be made from profits only. The profit sharing
trust then provided that in years without profit the contribution
to the pension trust may be made by the profit sharing trust, instead of by the employer.
The Commissioner early disturbed these dreams, by ruling
against such "feeder" arrangements. 4 As amended, this P. S. 37,
now contains the following additional provision:
In certain cases, however, in which employees have
non-forfeitable rights, they may designate the use of . . .
profit sharing funds, for their individual use, to meet the
cost of a pension plan that is also operated for their benefit.
In a letter-ruling to this writer of July 21, 152, E. I. McLarney, Deputy Commissioner, states that this clause does not
permit a feeder-arrangement. Pressed further, Norman A. Sugarman, Assistant Commissioner, on August 29, 1952, in a letterruling to this writer elaborated as follows:
Where a profit-sharing plan provides that a participant may request the use of the funds allocated to his
account (to the extent vested in him) for the payment
of premiums on a contract purchased by a pension trust
to provide retirement income for him in the event the
employer shall fail to make contributions to such pension
trust, such provision will not, of itself, cause the profitsharing trust to fail of exemption under section 165 (a)
of the Code.
The above examples differ from the situation discussed in your letter of June 26, 1952 and office reply
thereto of July 21, 1952. In your letter of June 26, 1952,
you quoted a proposed provision that would automatically
bear the employer's commitment under the pension plan
in any year its profits were insufficient to pay the cost
12Reg. 111, Section 29.165-1.
13Blume

11P.

Knitwear, 9 T. C. 1177.
S. 37.
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of such pension plan. The use of the funds of a profitsharing plan in the manner described in the second and
third paragraphs of this letter contemplate the use of
funds at the disposal of the participant and not as a part
of the funding of the employer's commitment under its
pension plan. A pension trust will not meet the qualification for exemption under Code section 165 (a) and
section 29.165-1 (a) of Regulations 111. where funding
of benefits provided under the plan depend upon the presence of annual profits.
It would seem that on the basis of this ruling, a clause in a
profit sharing trust, specifically agreed to be a participant, is unobjectionable if the clause authorizes the trustee to pay from the
participant's share in the profit sharing fund to the Pension Trust
that part of the pension trust contribution which is allocable to
the particular participant, in any year when the employer fails
to make his contribution to the pension trust. If this is so, then
the stress on the employer in a lean year is at least alleviated. Nonpayment by the employer of the contribution to the Pension Trust
for valid reasons will not, ordinarily, disqualify the Pension Trust;
and the participant will be glad to authorize payment of the pension contribution allocable to him from his share in the profit sharing fund, in order to protect the participant's investment in the
Pension Trust. The part of a pension contribution which is allocable to a specific participant is easily determined in the frequent
situatio .vhere
the pension plan is funded by the purchase of
annuities, often combined with life insurance proportionate to
the annuity, for each individual participant. The allocable part
of the total contribution then simply is the premium charged by
the insurance company for the annuity-part of the policy for this
particular participant.
(dd) An almost "discretionary" pension arrangement, leaving the selection of participating employees, and amount and time
of contributions entirely up to the employer, seems to be possible
under the recent T. J. Moss Tie Company case. 15 There a corporate
employer set up a trust for the purpose of assisting employees,
and in the discretion of the trustees distributions could be made
in case of retirement. The court held the trust a "charity" under
Section 101 (8), I. R. C., and contributions thereto deductible as
charitable contributions. This arrangement permits timing of the
contributions in years with high profits. Since no immediate benefits accrue to any individual employee, no income tax liability
of any employee would seem to arise at the time of the contribution,
and no stabilization problem would seem to occur until payment
to the employee. The Moss arrangement may solve the problem
of employers who "want to do something" for their employees
without tying themselves down to the somewhat rigid pattern of
a pension plan under Section 165 (a), I. R. C.
1 18 T. C. 25; Comm. I. R. announced Nonacquiessence, Int. Rev. Bul. No. 20,
Sept. 20, 1952, released since this article was written.

